I. INTRODUCTION
T he U.S. income tax system subsidizes contributions to charities by allowing individual taxpayers to itemize and deduct contributions from taxable income. In effect, taxpayers can receive a rebate from the government based on the contributions they make to charitable organizations. The current system relies on voluntary reporting of individual taxpayers' contributions to charitable organizations. For many taxpayers, charitable contributions are the only items on the return that are not subject to information reporting. Thus, there is a potential for misreporting -both overstating and understating -the actual amount of contributions. Two features characterize the reporting of charitable contributions in the United States. First, as Turk et al. (2007) show, misreporting is widespread. Of the roughly 43.6 million taxpayers who itemized their deductions in 2001, almost 37 million reported cash contributions and over 22 million reported noncash donations. Almost 46 percent of those reporting cash contributions and 37 percent of those reporting noncash contributions made errors. Second, while the aggregate amount of overstated contributions is fairly large ($13.6 billion in cash and $3.8 billion in noncash) the average error on each return is fairly small ($811 for returns with errors in cash contributions and $464 for returns with errors in noncash contributions) (Turk et al., 2007) . Even at the highest U.S. marginal tax rates this translates into less than $300 in understated tax. Standard enforcement mechanisms, which depend on expensive taxpayer audits and imperfect identifi cation of returns with errors, might not offer the most cost-effective means of improving compliance. Moreover, requiring documentation for charitable contributions from individual taxpayers beyond the current rules could create a large enough burden to discourage bona fi de contributions.
One alternative way to subsidize charitable contributions through the tax code would be to adopt a matching system, similar to the United Kingdom's Gift Aid system and the matching grant for contributions in the Bipartisan Policy Center's recent debt reduction proposal (Bipartisan Policy Center, 2010) . In such a system, the government matches the contributions of individual taxpayers at a given rate. For example, if the matching rate were 50 percent, a $10 contribution from an individual would be matched by a $5 government subsidy.
A switch to a matching regime could affect both compliance burden and behavior. Under a match, the responsibility for reporting could be placed on either the donor or the recipient. If the responsibility for reporting contributions were moved from individual donors to the recipient organizations, as in the Bipartisan Policy Center proposal, the compliance burden faced by individual taxpayers would decline, along with their opportunities to misreport. On the other hand, the annual compliance burden of tax-exempt organizations would increase, as governments would require additional information and documentation.
1 On net, compliance burden might be expected to decline under a switch to a matching program. The number of individual income tax fi lers reporting cash contributions far exceeds the number of non-profi t, charitable organizations fi ling an information return. As noted above, for 2001, 37 million individual income tax fi lers reported cash contributions, while 240,000 non-profi t, charitable (I.R.C Section 501c3) organizations fi led an annual information return (Arnsberger, 2001) . As each organization's return aggregates the contributions of multiple donors, scale economies in reporting would likely reduce the total compliance burden.
Even if reporting responsibility remained with the donor, compliance behavior might differ between the two regimes. Under the rebate system, over-reporting contributions increases the taxpayer's rebate (if not corrected by the government), while under the match, over-reporting increases the government's payment to the charity. Which system induces better compliance will depend on the relative values taxpayers place on benefi ts to themselves (a rebate) and benefi ts to charities. If compliance is greater under a match system, then switching to that regime could improve compliance even without additional expenditures for enforcement.
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This paper explores the tax policy and tax administration implications of matching rather than rebating contributions in a system with voluntary reporting of individual contributions. We conduct a novel experiment that tests both charitable giving and compliance behavior under the two regimes, allowing for misreporting and random auditing of contributions, with overstatements subject to a penalty.
The experiment, based on the design described in Turk et al. (2007) , is intended to explore two questions. First, in a replication of previous experiments Grossman, 2003, 2006) , we test how these alternative subsidy types affect the magnitude of charitable giving. While previous experiments presented subjects with equivalent rebate and match rates and found higher contributions under the match, they did not present equivalent budget sets across regimes. By allowing subjects to contribute their full income under either regime, charities could receive a larger maximum amount (contribution plus match) under a match. A more recent experiment (Lukas, Grossman, and Eckel, 2010) , did offer subjects equivalent budget sets under the rebate and the match, but did not test whether that change in experiment design affected subject behavior. Because we want to do so explicitly, our experiment includes rounds in which the contributions under a match are constrained so that charities can receive no more than under a rebate, as well as rounds in which match contributions are unconstrained, as in the earlier work.
Second, in order to study the administrative and compliance consequences of subsidizing contributions via a match rather than a rebate, the experiment includes rounds in which we subject taxpayers' contribution reports to the government to random auditing with a penalty for overstatements, and test how the type of subsidy affects not only contributions but also subjects' compliance with requirements for accurate reporting.
In Section II we briefl y summarize models of charitable giving behavior under subsidies. In Section III we explain our experiment design, and in Section IV we describe the subjects and their perceptions of the experiment. Section V describes contributions and compliance behavior by demographic group and analyzes the determinants of contribution amounts. Section VI contains our analysis of within-subject variation in both contribution and compliance behavior. Section VII concludes.
II. MODELS OF CHARITABLE GIVING BEHAVIOR WITH SUBSIDIES
In a basic model of charitable giving, each identical individual has an endowment (I), divided between purchases of a private good (Y) and contributions (x i ) to a public good (g). The government subsidizes the public good, either using a rebate at rate t -the individual's marginal tax rate -or a matching contribution at rate m. The subsidy thus reduces the price of charitable giving, defi ned as the amount of income an individual must give up for the charity to receive one dollar. Under a rebate, the price of giving $1 is (1 -t) ; under a match, that price is [1/(1 + m)]. The level of the public good is the sum of an individual's contribution (x i ) and those of everyone else in the society (X -i ). We assume that each individual allocates her endowment so as to maximize an additively separable utility function, subject to a budget constraint. Under a rebate, the individual's problem is
Under a match, the problem is instead
Now suppose that the rebate and match subsidies are equivalent, so that t = m/ (1 + m). It is then straightforward to show that if the individual makes equivalent donations, reducing the amount under the match so that the charity receives the same amount as under the rebate (i.e., x i,match = (1 -t) x i,rebate ), then the fi rst-order conditions for the two utility-maximization problems are identical. This result suggests that any departure from "equivalent" contributions under the two systems would reduce utility.
glow" -from contributing out-of-pocket 4 and obeying a proportional donation rule that depends only on their endowment and ignores the subsidy.
As an alternative model, suppose that the individual's contribution jointly produces the public good and a private benefi t (a "warm glow") that is determined by the amount of the initial out-of-pocket donation. In this case, Turk et al. (2007) show that an equivalent contribution would produce a smaller warm glow under a match regime than under a rebate regime. In other words, the individual making equivalent contributions would experience more utility with a rebate subsidy than with a matching subsidy. In order to generate indifference, consistent with the evidence in the experimental literature, match regime contributions would need to be higher than rebate regime contributions.
In order to explore how these two regimes affect reporting compliance, suppose, in a model with equivalent rebate and match subsidies and joint production (of the public good and a private benefi t), that the government audits a fraction of the individuals reporting donations. If the individual has overstated her donation, the audit detects the overstatement, adjusts the subsidy and imposes a penalty on the overstatement. In this case, Turk et al. (2007) show that an individual who makes equivalent contributions will not experience the same utility under both regimes. Rather, indifference will require a utility-maximizing individual to make nonequivalent choices of both her contribution and any overstated amount across the two regimes. In other words, changing the mechanism for subsidizing contributions can change both giving and compliance behavior.
We turn next to the design of our experiment, intended to explore both the magnitudes of contributions and compliance behavior across rebate and match subsidy regimes.
III. EXPERIMENT DESIGN
We allowed any interested adult who was able to understand the experiment instructions to participate, including walk-ins at the time of experiment sessions. We recruited subjects via fl yers posted on the University of Minnesota Twin Cities (UM) campus, emails to undergraduate UM Applied Economics majors, and directly from UM undergraduate classes in Applied Economics, Economics, and Psychology. One of the researchers visited the classes of willing professors early in the spring 2009 semester to describe the experiment and invite participation. Interested students either signed up for a session on the spot or subsequently made contact via email. Recruitment continued during the fi rst few experimental sessions, as we asked participants to refer friends for future sessions. A total of 465 subjects participated in the experiment.
We conducted 17 experiment sessions in February 2009 at the Social and Behavioral Sciences Laboratory at the University of Minnesota. Upon their arrival at the laboratory, subjects verifi ed that they were at least 18 years of age and signed in, enabling the researcher to check that they had not previously participated in the experiment.
They also received a copy of a consent form. The researcher seated each subject at a computer terminal in a separate cubicle and read out loud the text of a welcome and overview of the experiment. The overview explained that the experiment concerned charitable giving and that, at the outset, each subject would select a charity from a list that included each charity's name and a description of its mission. The experiment consisted of three sessions, each with multiple rounds. At its conclusion, one round would be randomly selected from each session to determine each subject's payout and the amount to be contributed to the subject's chosen charity. Subjects were informed that their names were collected only to make sure that no subject participated more than once; the sign-in sheets would be destroyed at the end of the experiment. Their names would never be associated with their responses and no one would be able to identify their individual responses in the published results. The researcher then solicited and answered questions and remained available to answer any additional questions that arose during the experiment.
Subjects were able to work through the experimental tasks at their own pace, following instructions appearing both on the experiment screen and on a written handout. Once fi nished, they completed a short survey regarding their demographic characteristics and opinions about the experiment, prior to collecting their cash earnings and an acknowledgment of their charitable donation.
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The fi rst experimental task, presented on the computer screen, was to select from a list of six nonprofi t organizations the recipient of any charitable donations the subject would make. 6 The organizations were chosen to ensure variety in charitable targets (natural resources, the arts, food security, health, social services) and scope (statewide, national, and international). Brief descriptions of each organization's mission were presented on the computer screen and subjects indicated their choices by clicking the appropriate box. For subjects who clicked the option, "Let us choose," one of the six charities was chosen at random.
The experiment then proceeded through three treatment stages. To help ensure that subjects understood the instructions and the consequences of their choices, each stage began with a practice round. In addition, the experiment software allowed subjects to try out different choices and see the resulting payout prior to entering their fi nal selection.
In the three rounds of the fi rst treatment, subjects were given an amount of income and asked to decide how much of this income to keep and how much to donate to their chosen charity. In each round, subjects were not allowed to make donations in excess 5 The complete text of these documents is available from the authors: Description of Charities, Welcome/ Overview, Experiment Instructions, and Survey Form. The demographic information collected by the survey consisted of subjects' gender, age, race/ethnicity, and student status. The perception questions concerned the worthiness of the chosen charity, the subject's belief that the charities would receive the experiment payouts, whether the subject understood the instructions, and whether the subject trusted confi dentiality procedures. 6 The listed charities were: American Refugee Committee International, American Diabetes Association, Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness, Emergency Food Shelf Network, Ordway Center for the Performing Arts, and Greater Twin Cities United Way.
of their income. While the income amounts were the same for all subjects ($50, $100, and $200), their order was randomized across subjects. The second treatment introduced two types of charitable giving subsidies: a rebate and a match. All subjects were given $100 in income in each of three rounds and again asked to decide how much to keep and how much to give to their chosen charity. Under a rebate subsidy, some fraction of each $1 donated would be returned to the subject. Under a match subsidy, some additional fraction of each $1 donated would be added to the subject's contribution to the charity. Each subject participated in one rebate and two match rounds. Subsidy rates for each subject's three rounds were set so that the price of giving $1 (i.e., the amount of income that had to be given up for the charity to receive $1) was held constant (equivalent subsidy). For example, a subject offered a 20 percent rebate for donations in one round would be offered a 25 percent match for donations in two other rounds. In all three of these rounds, the price of giving $1 would be $0.80. Three pairs of rebate/match subsidy rates were used (0.20/0.25, 0.25/0.33, and 0.50/1.00) with each subject randomly assigned to one of these pairs in all three rounds of this treatment. For each subject, the maximum donation permitted in one match round was $100 (all income) while in the other match round, the maximum donation was constrained further, to an amount equal to $100 times [1/(1 + match subsidy rate)] (or $100 times (1 -rebate rate)). As discussed earlier, we imposed this additional constraint in order to ensure that subjects faced the same experimental budget set in one of the match subsidy rounds as in the rebate subsidy round. The order of the rounds was randomized within each pair of subsidy rates. Note that this experimental treatment exhibited between-subject variation in subsidy rates (hence, the price of giving) and within-subject variation in subsidy types.
The budget line faced by subjects in the experiments relates possible combinations of the amounts gained by the subject and the chosen charity. For example, as illustrated in Figure 1 , if there is no subsidy, a subject chooses a point along a line between a combination of ($100 gain to subject, $0 gain to charity) and ($0 gain to subject, $100 gain to charity). If the rebate subsidy rate is 0.20, then a subject chooses a point along a line between a combination of ($100 gain to subject, $0 gain to charity) and ($20 gain to subject, $100 gain to charity). With an equivalent match subsidy rate of 0.25 and no further constraint, a subject chooses a point along a line between ($100 gain to subject, $0 gain to charity) and ($0 gain to subject, $125 gain to charity). Constraining the subject's donation under the match to no more than $80 ($100 times (1-0.20)) maintains the rebate budget line: ($100 gain to subject, $0 to charity) and ($20 gain to subject, $100 gain to charity). This allows us to test whether the observations in previous experiments of larger contributions under the match were due to subjects simply choosing consumption points along the lower right segment of the budget set. Lukas, Grossman, and Eckel (2010) constructed the budget sets differently. Instead of constraining giving under the match, they allowed subjects to give more than their endowment under the rebate regime. In the Figure 1 example, Lukas, Grossman, and Eckel (2010) would allow subjects under either the rebate or match regimes to provide up to $125 to the charity. Effectively, both constructions should yield budget sets that are equivalent between the rebate and match regimes. However, the approach we use lets the rebate regime more closely mimic the U.S. tax system, under which taxpayers are not allowed to deduct charitable contributions in excess of their income.
The budget line in Figure 1 also shows how compliance behavior could be infl uenced by a switch from a rebate to a matching system. As we noted above, under the rebate system, over-reporting contributions increases the taxpayer's rebate (if not corrected by the government), represented by the budget line shifting up from its position in Figure  1 . Under the match, over-reporting increases the government's payment to the charity, shifting the budget line to the right. How taxpayers react to the change in the constraint depends on their preferences, but it is clear that the regime change could affect giving, compliance, or both.
In the 12 rounds of the third treatment, subjects were again given $100 in income and asked to allocate that amount between themselves and their chosen charity. Any dona- tions made were subsidized and had to be reported to the researchers during the course of each round. The accuracy of those reports was subject to a random audit, with an announced probability. Subjects who overstated their donations (presumably in order to obtain a larger subsidy) and were audited were caught and penalized with lower earnings. The 12 rounds consisted of three sets of four rounds each. Subjects' reported donations in the fi rst set were subject to a zero probability of being audited. That probability rose to 0.10 and 0.50, respectively, in the second and third sets. Within each set, there were two rebate and two match rounds. The subsidy rates were 0.20 and 0.50 for the rebate rounds and 0.25 and 1.00 for the match rounds. Donations in the match rounds were constrained to maintain the same budget sets as in the corresponding rebate rounds. The order of these 12 rounds was distributed randomly across the subjects.
In the second and third sets of the third treatment, where subjects faced a greaterthan-zero audit probability, the experiment's software randomly selected subjects (with probability 0.10 or 0.50) and compared their actual and reported donations. In the absence of an audit, the charity received a base payment equal to the actual amount contributed by a subject. The subsidy, whether in the form of a rebate to the subject or an additional matching payment to the charity, was based on the reported contribution.
7 However, if an audit revealed that a subject's actual donation was less than her reported donation, then both the base payment to the charity and the subsidy (rebate or match) were based on the actual donation, and the subject was charged a fi ne, equal to 200 percent of the overstated subsidy (i.e., twice the product of the subsidy rate and the difference between her actual and reported donations). For example, if a subject reported $5 more than she actually gave, and the subsidy rate was 0.20, then the fi ne was $2. No penalty was applied when a reported donation was less than the actual donation. This payout structure mimics what happens in the current U.S. tax rebate regime.
In sum, the experiment included 24 different "states," or combinations of income, subsidy type, subsidy rate (price of giving), budget set constraint, and audit probability. Each subject faced a total of 18 states: the three states in the three rounds of Treatment 1, three of the nine possible states in Treatment 2, and the last 12 states in the twelve rounds of Treatment 3. A tabular representation of the experimental design is presented in Table 1 . A state-by-state summary of subject choices appears in Table 2 , where we present mean contributions (both actual and gross contributions, which are the subject's contributions plus the match, if any), compliance rates, mean over-and under-reported amounts, and the share of subjects under-and over-reporting.
At the end of the experiment session, subjects were paid 10 percent of the sum of the incomes they retained (net of any contributions and fi nes and inclusive of any rebates) from three randomly selected states, one from each treatment. On average, each subject received a payout of $24. On their behalf, the chosen charities were given 10 percent The mean over-reported amount is for non-compliant subjects only.
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The mean under-reported amount is for under-reporting subjects only.
of the contributions, inclusive of any match, made in the same three states. The mean contribution per subject was $10.
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Some suggest that behavior observed in an experimental setting may not be consistent with behavior outside that setting. One particular element concerns the experimental subjects themselves. For example, in this study, university students who are not representative of either the taxpayer or donor populations dominate the subject pool. However, some evidence suggests that using students as subjects in economics laboratory experiments does not lead to signifi cantly different outcomes than using other subjects. For example, Guillen and Veszteg (2006) conducted a meta-analysis of data from incentive-based economic experiments that were conducted at a single lab. They found that demographic differences (including student status) could explain only 4 percent of subjects' performance (payouts) in experiments. They also found that gender significantly affects subject performance (men get larger payouts), and some demographic differences signifi cantly affect the decision to participate in an experiment. Similarly, Frechette (forthcoming), in another meta-analysis of economic laboratory experiments, found that whether subjects were undergraduate students or professionals did not explain differences in subjects' behavior. Finally, Alm, Bloomquist, and McKee (2010) report the results of a tax compliance laboratory experiment in which subjects were roughly equally divided between students and university staff. The authors found that, while average levels of compliance differed between students and non-students, changes in compliance behavior in response to different experiment treatments were quite similar.
Notwithstanding this evidence, we do not claim that the results of our experiment can be directly extrapolated to either the taxpayer or the donor populations. Rather, we offer them as suggestive of how charitable giving behavior might respond to alternative government subsidies.
IV. EXPERIMENT SUBJECTS AND THEIR PERCEPTIONS
Demographic characteristics of the 465 subjects, as reported on the survey instrument they completed at the conclusion of the experiment sessions, are summarized in Table  3 . Subjects were nearly evenly split between the two genders, and the vast majority (70 percent) reported their race/ethnicity as White. Asian/Pacifi c Islander was the only other race/ethnicity group with a considerable number of subjects (20 percent). Presumably because our recruiting focused on the UM campus, the majority of subjects in the experiment were students (94 percent) and either in their twenties (32 percent) or younger (61 percent). A slight majority (53 percent) of subjects reported themselves to be freshmen, with fewer and fewer subjects in each successive year in school. Students were asked whether they were majoring (or intending to major) in economics, applied economics or business. A slight majority of subjects (53 percent) reported to be in these majors. Notes: Asterisks denote signifi cant difference between means or rates at the 1% (***) probability level. 1 Amounts refl ect State 2 data, with no tax subsidy and income = 100.
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The t-statistics are calculated for the comparison of White subjects versus Asian/Pacifi c Islander subjects.
The experiment subjects' perceptions of the experiment are summarized in Table 4 . A majority of subjects reported that they agree or strongly agree that the chosen charity was worthy of support (93 percent), that the charities would receive the fi nal payouts credited to them (89 percent), that they understood the experiment instructions (82 percent), and that their anonymity would be preserved (92 percent). Each question had approximately the same percentage of "strongly disagree" responses (2.6 or 2.8 percent), and the largest percentage of combined "disagree" and "strongly disagree" responses (5.6 percent) were associated with the statement, "I understood the instructions for this experiment."
V. DETERMINANTS OF CONTRIBUTION AMOUNTS
In Table 5 , we present the results of four ordinary least squares regressions that explore the impacts of experimental manipulations and demographic characteristics on the magnitude of charitable contributions. These regressions analyze variations both between and within subjects. The fi rst two columns (Treatment 2: No Noncompliance Allowed) present regression coeffi cients from the second experimental treatment, in which subjects faced different subsidy regimes and subsidy rates but were not asked to report their contributions -hence, noncompliance was not possible. We performed ordinary least squares regressions with two dependent variables: gross contributions -inclusive of the government's match in the match subsidy rounds -and actual contributions -the subjects' initial out-of-pocket contributions. Holding the subsidy rate constant, actual contributions in (unconstrained) match rounds were signifi cantly lower (about $5.61 lower) than in rebate rounds, but gross contributions were signifi cantly higher (about $9.14 higher).
9 Since a $1 actual contribution would yield more to a charity under a matching subsidy than a rebate subsidy, one would expect on theoretical grounds that subjects would reduce match-subsidized contributions, as these results seem to corroborate. If that reduction completely offset the match, then one would expect gross contributions to be the same in both rebate and match regimes. These results suggest that the reduction in contributions is incomplete, so that the match-inclusive gross contribution is higher than under a rebate. The last two columns (Treatment 3: Noncompliance Allowed) present coeffi cients from the third experimental treatment, where subjects report their contributions, under the threat of an audit and penalty. In this case as well, actual contributions are signifi cantly lower in match subsidy rounds (about $5.52 lower) and gross contributions are signifi cantly higher (about $8.52 higher).
In Treatment 2, again holding the subsidy rate constant, imposing the budgetary constraint during match rounds had no additional statistically signifi cant impact on either actual or gross contributions. The subsidy rate is defi ned as one minus the price of giving.
In both the second and third experimental treatments, gross contributions rise signifi cantly with the subsidy rate. Actual contributions respond positively to the subsidy rate in Treatment 2 but not in Treatment 3. Note here that in carrying out the regression, the match subsidy rates were rescaled so that the subsidy rates refl ect (one minus) the price of giving, the same as the rebate subsidy rates.
Regarding the subjects' signifi cant demographic characteristics, males made smaller gross and actual contributions ($4.66-$6.78 less); those in their 20's (Treatment 2) gave less while those in their 30's or older (Treatments 2 and 3) gave more; and students who were juniors gave more and economics majors contributed less (Treatments 2 and 3).
11 Relative to other race/ethnicities, whites (Treatments 2 and 3) and Asians (Treatment 3) gave less. Subjects who did not choose a charity, but left it to the experimental software to randomly choose one (24 subjects, or 5.2 percent of all subjects), gave less than those who picked a charity.
In Treatment 3, a higher audit probability had no signifi cant impact on either actual or gross contributions. A prior audit experience (that is, having been subjected to an audit in the prior round of the experiment) also had no apparent effect on either actual or gross contributions. Table 6 contains the results of fi xed-effects regressions (considering only the withinsubject variation) that explore the impact of experimental manipulations on gross and actual contributions in Treatments 1 and 2.
VI. WITHIN-SUBJECT VARIATION ANALYSIS
12 By limiting the analysis to variations in contributions within subjects, we remove variations in the responses to the experiment that result from differences between subjects, offering more tightly controlled results. In the fi rst column (corresponding to the fi rst experimental treatment), actual contributions rise signifi cantly with income: each $10 increase in income is associated with an additional $2.60 contribution. This corresponds to an income elasticity of 1.10.
As we have previously discussed, we don't claim that the estimated elasticities from our stylized experimental environment and student-dominated subject pool are directly comparable to those derived from tax return data. Moreover, Andreoni (2006) notes that estimated price and income elasticities in the literature span a wide range and vary with income. For example, Bakija and Heim (2008) report income elasticities between 0.104 and 0.846 for taxpayers with income less than $200,000 of income and between .783 and 0.829 for those with incomes of $200,000 and above. In their experimental paper on subsidized charitable giving, Eckel and Grossman (2003) report income elasticities between 0.77 and 1.03, depending on the subsidy type. Our estimated income elasticity is higher than the empirically based range reported by Bakija and Heim (2008) and just above the upper end of Eckel and Grossman's (2003) experimental results.
The second and third columns, refl ecting the second experimental treatment, show the results when subjects face different subsidy types. As in the OLS results, actual contributions are signifi cantly lower in match rounds (about $5.61 lower) while gross contributions in match rounds increase by a larger amount (about $9.14). Here, constraining the budget set of a match round does signifi cantly reduce both actual (about $1.67) and gross ($2.91) contributions. Adding together the two coeffi cients (for the match and match-constrained dummies), subjects in budget-constrained match rounds lower their actual contributions by about $7.28, relative to rebate rounds with equivalently set subsidy rates. Gross of the match, their contributions are about $6.23 higher. As in the OLS results, this fi xed-effects analysis suggests that subjects do not fully adjust their actual contributions when offered a matching subsidy. Furthermore, it suggests that about 68 percent of the observed difference between the unconstrained match and rebate gross contributions remains when the match regime budget set is constrained (i.e., 6.23 is about 68 percent of 9.14). In other words, only 32 percent of the difference between unconstrained match and rebate gross contributions disappears when the match budget set is constrained.
The results in Table 7 refl ect the third experimental treatment, introducing opportunities for noncompliance (over-stating contributions), subject to random audits and penalties. All match states in this treatment presented constrained budget sets. As in the second treatment, in this case subjects lower their actual contributions in match states, relative to their behavior in rebate states. The magnitude of this effect depends on the subsidy rate. For example, for the second column of the actual contribution regressions, actual contributions are ($1.41-$19.80* subsidy rate) lower in match rounds, relative to rebate rounds. 13 Gross contributions, on the other hand, are signifi cantly higher in match rounds. This result also depends on the subsidy rate: gross contributions are (-$2.85+32.46*subsidy rate) higher in match states (the second column of the gross contribution regressions).
14 The second column of the actual contributions regressions in Table 7 also shows that the subsidy rate has a signifi cantly positive effect on actual contributions in rebate states (the coeffi cient is 10.349) and a signifi cantly negative impact on actual contributions in match cases (the coeffi cient is 10. 349 -19.796) . Note that in the absence of a term interacting the subsidy rate and the match dummy, as in the fi rst column, these opposing effects cancel, leaving the subsidy rate coeffi cient insignifi cant. Turning to gross contributions, the impact of the subsidy rate, however, is unambiguously positive and signifi cant, regardless of subsidy type. In addition, the impact is unambiguously larger under the matching subsidy. For example, in a rebate state, increasing the subsidy rate from 0.20 to 0.25 is associated with an increase in gross contributions of $0.52 (the difference between $10.40*0.20 and $10.40*0.25), while for a match state, the equivalent subsidy increase (from 0.25 to 0.33) is associated with a larger increase of $2.14 in gross contributions (the difference between (10.40+32.462)*0.20 and (10.40+32.462)*0.25). As the (equivalent) subsidy rates increase further, the gap between gross match contributions and gross rebate contributions grows wider. This fi nding is consistent with the hypothesis that subjects may have been confused regarding rebate and match subsidy rates that, while offering equivalent prices of giving, differed numerically. If experiment subjects make choices based on the numerical value of the subsidy rate, rather than the impact of the rate on the outcome for themselves or the charity, then a stronger response to larger numerical increases in the match subsidy rate might be expected. Earlier studies hypothesized that experiment subjects may make choices based on the numerical value of the subsidy rate, rather than the impact of the rate on the price of giving. As an additional test of this possibility, we compared mean contri- Notes: Asterisks denote signifi cance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) probability levels.
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The subsidy rate is defi ned as one minus the price of giving.
butions in two states where the subsidy rate was numerically the same (0.25), but the subsidy type differed (states 5 and 7). We found no statistically signifi cant difference between mean contributions in these states. Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that subjects, due to a form of "rate illusion," condition their donations on the stated subsidy rate rather than the price of giving. Using average contributions and average prices across either rebate or match rounds, our estimated price elasticity of giving is -0.23 for rebate rounds and -0.75 for match rounds. Again, estimated elasticities from studies using tax data span a wide range, but our results can be compared with those of Eckel and Grossman (2003) , who report price elasticities of -0.34 for a rebate and -1.07 for a match.
Reprising results described earlier, subjects gave somewhat less under a match than under an equivalent rebate, but not enough less to offset the matching payment to the charity. With one exception, neither a higher audit probability nor the experience of an audit in the preceding round appears to have impacts on actual or gross contributions (an audit in the prior round has a negative impact on gross contributions, at the 10 percent signifi cance level). The negative coeffi cient on the round variable suggests that subjects reduced their gross contributions in later rounds, possibly due to a learning effect. Recall, however, that the states were randomized across subjects, so that the experimental parameters in any particular round differed across subjects. Therefore, evidence that subjects adjusted their behavior as they progressed through the experiment does not discredit the estimated impacts of the independent variables on subject behavior.
In Table 8 , we analyze the impacts of the subsidy rate, audit probability, and prior audit on the magnitudes of all subjects' gross over-reporting of contributions in Treatment 3. Because we observed a large number of subjects with zero over-reporting, we employed a Tobit fi xed-effects approach in order to account for our censored sample.
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The dependent variable in each of these regressions is the amount of over-reported gross contributions: gross (of match, if any) reported contribution less gross (of match, if any) actual contribution. We considered over-reporting to be zero if reported and actual contributions were equal or if reported contributions were less than the actual contribution.
In all four models, over-reporting declines signifi cantly as the subsidy rate increases. For example, in the base model (without interactions between the independent variables), an increase in the subsidy rate from zero to 0.20 is associated with a decline in over-reporting of $2.91. Note that when we add an interaction between the subsidy rate and the match dummy, we fi nd no evidence that the negative impact of increases in the subsidy rate is different in match, relative to rebate, rounds.
Declining non-compliance (less over-reporting) in the face of increasing subsidies might seem counter-intuitive: why wouldn't subjects take advantage of enhanced opportunities to earn either rebates or matches? Audits and penalties can provide a more Notes: Asterisks denote signifi cance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) probability levels. N = 465 subjects/5,580 observations. Over-reported amounts for all compliant subjects = 0, even if they under-reported. Tobit Impact = Tobit regression estimate x probability of over-reporting (which is 0.22).
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complete explanation. In the presence of a higher subsidy rate, subjects must balance the potential gain of over-reporting more against the potential amount they might lose if they are audited and assessed a penalty. The relative sizes of these potential gains and losses, together with subjects' attitudes toward risk, may leave the sign of the net impact of a higher subsidy rate uncertain. In this experiment, audited over-reporting subjects pay a fi ne equal to twice the product of the over-reported amount and the subsidy rate. Thus, the penalty increases, steeply, not only with the over-reported amount, but also with the subsidy rate. Certainly, attitudes toward risk would affect behavioral responses and likely vary across subjects, but the experimental audit and penalty structure adopted in this experiment appear consistent with fi nding reduced over-reporting as the subsidy rate rises.
In all four models, over-reporting declines signifi cantly as the probability of audit increases. In the base model, over-reporting falls by $3.80 when the audit probability rises from zero to 0.10, and by another $15.20 when the audit probability rises from 0.10 to 0.50. This corresponds with an elasticity of over-reporting with respect to the audit rate of -0.83 in rebate rounds and -0.92 in match rounds. The negative impact of a rising audit probability on over-reporting does not increase in rebate rounds, as the match*audit probability interaction terms, while positive, are not signifi cant.
Three of the regressions suggest that over-reporting is signifi cantly lower in match rounds, relative to rebate rounds. In the base model, subjects over-reported $1.45 less in match rounds. Adding a term interacting the match dummy with the audit probability, the impact is larger ($1.68 lower). However, as noted above, since this interaction term is positive, subjects would appear to be more compliant under a match regime than under a rebate when it is unlikely that the non-compliance will be detected -i.e., with a low probability of audit. As the audit probability increases, the results suggest (weakly) that the compliance difference between the regimes dissipates.
Finally, the signifi cantly positive Round coeffi cient suggests that over-reporting increases as this part of the experiment progresses, by about $0.23 per round. This may well refl ect subjects' learning. It is particularly interesting because it occurs despite the randomized order of the rounds across subjects.
VII. CONCLUSION
The current U.S. tax system relies on voluntary reporting of individual taxpayers' contributions to charitable organizations, creating opportunities for non-compliance for millions of taxpayers. At the same time, nonprofi t organizations place great value on the tax system's subsidy to charitable contributions. Switching from a system that subsidizes charitable contributions with a tax deduction to one in which the government matches donors' contributions could affect both charitable giving and tax compliance behavior, affecting the interests of both the nonprofi t sector and individual taxpayers; it could also reduce the costs of administering the subsidy through the tax system.
In this paper we analyze the results of a novel economic experiment that compares subsidized charitable giving and reporting compliance behavior under both rebate and matching regimes. Previous laboratory economic experiments have shown that total contributions to charities are higher in a matching system, relative to one with tax-deductible contributions. But some experiments did not use equivalent budget sets across the two regimes, raising the question of whether the experiment design was responsible for the larger match contributions. To test the impact of these non-equivalent budget sets, our experiment includes rounds in which the contributions under a match are constrained, as well as unconstrained match rounds.
We fi nd that constraining giving in match regimes reduces contributions relative to the unconstrained cases, but not enough to fully explain the difference between contributions under the match and rebate regimes. We also fi nd that actual contributions in match rounds were signifi cantly lower than in rebate cases, while gross contributions (including the government match) were signifi cantly higher. If that reduction were to completely offset the match, then one would expect gross contributions to be the same under both rebate and match regimes. However, our results suggest that the reduction in contributions is incomplete, so that match-inclusive gross contributions tend to be higher than under a rebate.
In addition to testing the effect of the regimes on charitable giving, we subject taxpayers' contribution reports to random auditing with a penalty for overstatements and test how the type of subsidy affects both contributions and the accuracy of reports. We fi nd that higher audit probabilities, and in some cases higher subsidy rates, are associated with smaller amounts of over-reporting. We also fi nd that the match subsidy is associated with less over-reporting -and thus greater tax compliance -relative to the rebate subsidy. In some cases, the audit probability effect is stronger when contributions are subsidized by a rebate. However, we fi nd that the net effect on compliance is greater under the match regime unless audit rates are extremely high.
